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most overt sort of action has been directed against doctors because of their
affiliation with group-practice prepayment plans. Whether judicial protection
will be applied against the more subtle methods of coercion, or to the individual
practitioner, remains a matter for speculation.
For this purpose, the cases provide little guidance except insofar as they delineate more technical problems such as proof of conspiracy and permissible defenses. They indicate that organized medicine can justify the regulation of its
members' practices through ostensible enforcement of the code of medical ethics,
except where the economic interests of third parties are affected. There, justification must be shown, and enforcement must not be contrary to public policy
or law (i.e., in restraint of trade). Whether attempts by organized medicine to
curtail or destroy prepaid medical service plans will conform to public policy in
this sense is at best arguable and at least doubtful.

LAW APPLICABLE TO CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES FOR CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY IN FTCA CASES
The Federal Tort Claims Act' provides that tort actions against the government shall be governed by the law of the place where the tort occurred.2 In accordance with this provision, the rights and liabilities of parties in proceedings
under the Act have generally been determined according to local law.3
The FTCA contains no provision for contribution or indemnity, either in
160 Stat. 842 (1946), 61 Stat. 722 (1947), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110,
2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1950).
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (Supp., 1954) confers on the federal district courts "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages.., for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28
U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1948) provides that "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances. .. "
3E.g., Rushford v. United States, 204 F. 2d 831, 832 (C.A. 2d, 1953); United States v.
Gaidys, 194 F. 2d 762, 764 (C.A. 10th, 1952).
But local law has been found inapplicable to determine certain questions arising under the
Act where uniform federal standards were deemed appropriate. Thus, federal rather than local

standards are employed to determine when a tortfeasor is an employee of the United States
within the scope of his employment. United States v. Sharpe, 189 F. 2d 239, 241 (C.A. 4th,
1951); Field v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 401, 405 (N.D. Ill.,
1952); Williams v. United

States, 105 F. Supp. 208, 209 (N.D. Cal., 1952); see Hubsch v. United States, 174 F. 2d 7
(C.A. 5th, 1949). Other courts, however, have decided this question without reference to federal standards, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 201 F. 2d 135 (C.A. 5th, 1953); Murphey v. United
States, 179 F. 2d 743 (C.A. 9th, 1950).
The class of permissive plaintiffs under the Act has also been found to constitute a question
for federal rather than local determination. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950),
denied the right of a serviceman or survivor to institute a claim under the Act for serviceconnected injuries. Accord: Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va., 1953);
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favor of or against the United States. 4 Such claims, however, have been allowed in a number of cases. Claims against the government for contribution and
indemnity have uniformly been decided in accordance with local law.5 But the
choice of law for determiration of claims by the government has not been
uniform.6
In UnitedStates v. Arizona 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applied state law in upholding the dismissal of a claim by the United
States for contribution or indemnity against a joint tortfeasor. The Arizona case
is the first to consider expressly the question of whether state or federal law
should be applied to claims for contribution and indemnity arising out of actions
'under the FTCA. s
Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. N.C., 1953) (federal prisoners may not be
claimants regardless of local law).
The Act contains various exceptions to the rule that local law shall determine liability
(see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680). Such an exception "must be interpreted under the general
laW rather than under some peculiar interpretation of a State or Territory." Stepp v. United
States, 207 F. 2d 909, 911 (C.A. 4th, 1953). And the limitation provision of the Act has been
held to prevail over a local statute of limitations. Maryland v. United States, 165 F. 2d 869,
871 (C.A. 4th, 1947); Young v. United States, 184 F. 2d 587, 589-90 (App. D.C., 1950).
4 Consult note 23 infra.
5 Contribution against the United States: United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543
(1951); Patterson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 197 F. 2d 252, 253 (C.A. 2d, 1952) where contribution was awarded, apparently under the "applicable Pennsylvania statute." In Brown &
Root, Inc. v. United States, 198 F. 2d 138 (C.A. 5th, 1952), a claim for contribution was disallowed because the Texas statute did not provide for contribution where the claimant had
settled the original claim. See Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451, 452 (D. Md.,
1947).
Indemnity against the United States: St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 187 F.
2d 925, 927 (C.A. 5th, 1951) (held that since the facts would give rise to an action under
Mississippi law if private parties were involved, "a case is made out against the United States
under the [FTCA]"). Accord: United States v. Acord, 209 F. 2d 709, 714 (C.A. 10th, 1954).
See Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. United States, 182 F. 2d 149 (C.A. 8th, 1950).
6Showers v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 350, 352 (M.D. Pa., 1953), allowed the government to recover contribution, stating that "the right of contribution of the United States...
is governed by the law of Pennsylvania." Accord: Di Benedictis v. United States, 103 F.
Supp. 462, 463-64 (W.D. Pa., 1952).
In United States v. Savage Truck Line, 209 F. 2d 442, 446-47 (C.A. 4th, 1953), the government was allowed indemnity under "generally recognized" principles. Since local law was
"in line with these conclusions," the court did not consider the question of applicable law.
In United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954) state law was disregarded in the determination of the government's right to indemnity from its negligent employee. See discussion in text, p. 724 infra. But in Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337, 340 (S.D. Tex.,
1953), on similar facts the court found the claim a valid one under federal common law.
7 214 F. 2d 389 (C.A. 9th, 1954), petition for rehearing en banc denied 216 F. 2d 248 (C.A.

9th, 1954).
8 In none of the earlier cases, despite their divergent results, has the question of applicable
law been placed in issue. See cases cited in notes 5 and 6 supra.
Although the pleadings in the original appeal in the Arizona case do not indicate that the
parties contested the issue of applicable law, the court's express ground for upholding
dismissal is that Arizona law prevents recovery. United States v. Arizona, 214 F. 2d 389, 392

/95 )

COMMENTS

Early in 1949, the State of Arizona had been deeded various tracts of a former
military reservation by the War Assets Administration. About April 2, 1949,
Krause, a boy scout allegedly permitted on the reservation by Arizona, was
injured while "fooling around with a bazooka shell" which he had found on the
premises. Krause brought an action against the United States under the FTCA,
alleging that his injuries were the result of the negligence of a United States
Army decontamination team. The United States denied negligence, alleging
that any fault lay with Arizona, and filed a third-party complaint against
Arizona "for contribution and/or indemnity." The district court separated the
third-party claim from the main action. judgment on the main action was for
the injured scout against the United States.9 The district court, without opinion,
later granted Arizona's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit upheld dismissal. 1 The court believed that the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Yellow Cab Co." required the application of state law, 2 and found that state law did not permit recovery. 3 In
(C.A. 9th, 1954). The question of applicable law was expressly placed before the court in the
petition for a rehearing en banc. 216 F. 2d 248 (C.A. 9th, 1954).
9Krause v. United States, D. Ariz., Civil No. 543 (Dec. 3, 1951) (not reported). Appeal was
dismissed, the record not having been forwarded in time. United States v. Krause, 197 F. 2d
329 (C.A. 9th, 1952).
10Appeal was first dismissed on the ground that notice of appeal was defective. United
States v. Arizona, 206 F. 2d 159 (C.A. 9th, 1953). On appeal the Supreme Court held that notice
was adequate and ordered the claim reinstated. United States v. Arizona, 346 U.S. 907 (1953).
Upon reinstatement by the Ninth Circuit, the parties were in disagreement as to the grounds
on which the district court had dismissed the claim. The United States contended that the
grounds were jurisdictional and procedural. In its brief the government argued: (1) that the
proceedings did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; (2) that the
United States was not required to comply with the conditions prescribed by Arizona in waiving
its immunity from suit. Brief for United States at 7-11, 11-18, United States v. Arizona, 214
F. 2d 389 (C.A. 9th, 1954). Arizona contended that dismissal was on substantive grounds and
should be upheld since the United States did not state an adequate claim for relief under the
common-law rules for indemnity or contribution. It cited no Arizona case or statute exemplifying these rules, but did cite various federal common-law cases. Moreover, Arizona argued that
since it had not waived its immunity to suit for tort, it could not be sued in such an action.
Brief for Arizona at 4-6, 6-12, ibid.
"United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
2"[TIhe implications of the Yellow Cab case... are clear that the lower court would have
been justified in dismissing the third party complaint.., on the ground that the law of
Arizona does not permit contribution among tort-feasors under the.., facts...." 214 F. 2d
389, 394-95 (1954).
"3The court cited Schade Transfer & Storage Co. v. Alabam Freight Lines, 75 Ariz. 201,
254 P. 2d 800 (1953), as its sole authority for the applicable Arizona law. In that case a
defendant, who had been held liable for injuries resulting from an unloading operation conducted jointly by its employee and an employee of the third-party defendant, sued for indemnity. The court asserted that such recovery was allowable only where the defendant could
prove the third-party defendant guilty of independent negligence that was the sole proximate
cause of the jury. Finding that such facts were not proved, recovery was denied.
In its petition for a rehearing en banc, the United States contended that the Schade case
was not conclusive since it dealt solely with a claim for indemnity, recovery being denied on the
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a second opinion, denying a petition for a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the contention that the decisions of the Supreme Court in United
4
States v.GilnanH
and United States v. Standard Oil Co."5 rendered state law
inapplicable.
I
In the Yellow Cab case the Supreme Court allowed a joint tortfeasor to recover contribution from the government under the FTCA. Viewing the
"breadth of purpose... [of] the bill as a whole... ,"I6 the Court held that
claims for contribution were included. Contribution was allowed in accordance
with local law.17 But the Court expressly noted in a footnote that the issue of
the applicability of local law, not being in dispute, was not before it.8 The only
other reference to applicable law is contained in the following passage:
Of course there is no immunity from suit by the Government to collect claims...
due it from its joint tort-feasors ....[T]his right ... [should be enforceable] by im-

pleading the joint tort-feasor ....See 3 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) 507,
elseq.... [I]f the Act is interpreted as now urged by the Government, it would mean
that if an injured party recovered judgment against the Government, the Government
could then sue its joint tort-feasor (local substantive law permitting). 9
The holding itself furnishes scant authority for the Arizona decision. It is
solely a determination of the scope of the liability of the government under its
waiver of immunity in the Act. Presumably, local law is applied to the claim
only because it falls within the scope of the waiver. In the Arizona case, where
the claim is by the government, this rationale for the application of local law is
absent.
The Ninth Circuit, however, may have based its use of local law upon the
words of the Yellow Cab opinion quoted above. The parenthetical clause in the
quoted passage may indicate the Supreme Court's belief that local law should
be applied to a claim for contribution by the government. But the value of the
parenthetical expression as authority for this contention must be discounted.
First, it is interjected in an argument not adopted by the Court, and no such
facts and not because common-law indemnity did not exist in Arizona. The court dismissed
this contention, conceding that the Schade case might not be identical, but stating that it provided sufficient ground for concluding that Arizona law would probably not sanction the
requested recovery. 216 F. 2d 248, 249 (1954).
14347 U.S. 507 (1954).
1 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
16340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951).
1
7 The Yellow Cab case resolved a conflict between circuits: aff'g Howey v. Yellow Cab Co.,
181 F. 2d 967 (C.A. 3d, 1950), and rev'g Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F. 2d 825
(App. D.C., 1950). In the Howey case, the contribution claim was held to fall within the waiver
of immunity, and contribution was permitted under Pennsylvania law. The Capital Transit
case, however, held such a claim outside the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity, although local law sanctioned such recovery between private parties. The government's contention before the Supreme Court was that the waiver did not extend to such a claim: it made
no contention as to the applicability of local or federal law.
Is340 U.S. 543, 546 n. 2 (1951).
19Ibid., at 551-52 (italics added).
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qualification is stated or implied at any other point in the opinion.20 Secondly,
the Court earlier expressly noted that it was not deciding the question of applicable law, even as to claims against the government.21 Finally, the question
of the government's right to contribution was not before the Court, and any
reference to it is dicta. Yet the Ninth Circuit found that the "implications" of
the Yellow Cab case sufficed to make state law applicable to the facts of the
Arizona case.
The Arizona court asserted that the Yellow Cab decision was based upon the
rule of ErieR. Co. v. Tompkins.22 But neither that case nor its rule are mentioned
in the Yellow Cab opinion. Since Yellow Cab finds that a contribution claim
against the government is included under the terms of the Act, application of
the Erie rule seems superfluous, and the inference that it was applied is unsupported in the opinion. Thus, nothing in the Yellow Cab opinion dictates the use
of local law in a claim for contribution by the United States.
Another basis for the Arizona decision can perhaps be found in what may be
called the "parity" theory. Under this view, the government has by passage of
the FTCA consented, with only stipulated exceptions, to be placed on a parity
with a similarly situated private tortfeasor. Since the right to contribution is
not included among the exceptions, it arguably should be governed by local
law, as would a like claim by a private counterpart.23 The application of the
"parity" theory to claims by the government arising from actions under the
FTCA was presented to the Supreme Court for the first time in United States
v. Gilman. 4
20This qualification is not introduced in the first sentence of the quoted passage, which
announces the existence of a right to contribution in the government. The authority cited by
the Court at this point, 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 14.29 (2d ed., 1948), contends, in the very
section cited, that the government's claim is a matter for federal rather than state law. The
Supreme Court presumably was aware that the proposition that state law was applicable was an
arguable one. Had the Court intended to make such an assertion, they might easily have done
so in a less elliptical fashion.
" Consult note 18 supra.
- 214 F. 2d 389, 391-92 (1954). The Erie case is reported in 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2"The parity theory may be inferred from an expansive reading of the words of the Act:
"The United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.... ." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1948). This theory is also consistent with all of the cases dealing with the derivative liability of the United States under
the Act. See cases cited in note 5 supra. And see United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S.
366, 370 (1949), where the Supreme Court, upholding the right of subrogees to sue under
the Act, said: "the language of the Act indicates a congressional purpose that the United
States be treated as if it were a private person in respect to torts committed by its employees,
except for certain specified exceptions enumerated in the Act...."
Legislative history, in particular the omission from the Act of an early proposal for a right
over, has been thought to indicate congressional intent to relegate such rights to local law
determination. But the extraordinary complexity of the legislative history of the Act has led
at least one commentator to "question whether the congressional intent to enact law on...
contribution... became sufficiently specific ... that the courts should feel bound to interpret the statute in accordance with these brief statements that preceded enactment by several
years." 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 14.29, at 514-15, n. 19 (2d ed., 1948).
24347 U.S. 507 (1954).
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The Gilman case involved a claim by the government for indemnity from its
employee for whose negligence it had been held liable under the FTCA. The
government argued that passage of the FTCA placed it on a parity with a
private employer respecting suit by its tort victim, and it was thereby entitled
to the same right of indemnity; the Yellow Cab decision was said to "show the
way.)

25

The Supreme Court, however, distinguished the situation from that in the
Yellow Cab case:
In that case ... the claim was within the class covered by the waiver of sovereign
immunity....
The present case is quite different. We deal
not with the liability of the United
2
States, but with the liability of its employees.
The Court took notice of the important governmental problems arising from
the relation of the United States to its employees and of the fiscal problem involved in governmental liability under the FTCA.
The proper disposition of a case involving such governmental problems was
said to be dictated by United States v. Standard Oil Co.,27 in which the Court
declined to extend the common-law action of per quod servitium amiset to cover
the government-soldier relationship, stating that the problem involved federal
policy which- Congress, not the Supreme Court, should formulate. The Court in
the Gilman case stated that "the reasons for following that course in the present
case are even more compelling,"2 since "here a complex of relations between

federal agencies and their staffs is involved. '29 The claim "presents questions of
policy on which Congress has not spoken,"30 and the selection of that policy is
appropriately for Congress.
Thus the Gilman case clearly removes claims against a government employee
from the scope of the "parity" argument. But the status of the "parity" theory
as to claims by the government against strangers cannot be determined from
the Gilman opinion. In any event, the first Supreme Court opinion to deal with
the "parity" theory respecting claims for contribution and indemnity rejected
its application. It is not clear, moreover, that the Arizona decision was based
upon the "parity" theory.3 Insofar as the "parity" theory was relied upon the
decision stands on uncertain ground.
II
On the basis of the Gilman decision the United States in the Arizona case
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en banc. 2
Ibid., at 509.
26

Ibid.

27332

U.S. 301 (1947).

8 347 U.S. 507, 511 (1954).

29Ibid.

30Ibid.

11See 214 F. 2d 389, 394 (1954).
government also protested that the court misapprehended the Arizona law on contribution and indemnity. See note 13 supra.
2The
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The Ninth Circuit delivered a second opinion"s considering the impact of the
Gilman decision and of United States v. Standard Oil Co.34 on its previous determination that state law should apply.
The StandardOil case did not arise under the FTCA. The government sought
reimbursement for hospitalization and loss of services of a soldier injured
through the negligence of the defendant. The Court found that Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins was irrelevant to the determination of "the question of whether this
issue is to be determined by federal or state law," 35 since the case involved the
legal relations of the federal government and was not primarily of local interest.
The Court declined to apply state law to the issue because of (1) the distinctively federal character of the relationship between government and soldier;
(2) the absence of peculiarly local interests; (3) the absence of valid reason for
local variance and the desirability of uniformity; and (4) the incidence upon the
fiscal powers of the federal government.
The Court then refused to create, by analogy to established common-law
liabilities, a new liability to cover the situation. Since "the issue comes down in
final consequence to a question of federal fiscal policy,"36 the making of such
policy is appropriately for Congress, not the Supreme Court.' 7
The Arizona situation, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, did not fall within
the federal law area defined by the Standard Oil and Gilmnan cases. The basis
for employing a federal rule in these cases, according to the Ninth Circuit, was
that, "in both Gilman and StandardOil, the Supreme Court finds elements in
the relationship of the government and its employee or soldier that justify a
'3 8
federal rule overriding ordinary state rules."
Thus it appears to the court that:
[B]efore a court is justified in venturing into the field of creating a [new] federal rule
for contribution or indemnity under the Tort Claims Act there must be some element
in the case affecting the affairs of the United States above and beyond the fact that
the United States has had to pay money for the negligence of its employees. 39
But here the court finds that "no fiscal problem above and beyond the payment
of the original judgment is presented" 4 nor is "the internal management of the
'
government ... involved in some special way.

41

F. 2d 248 (1954).
5Ibid., at 303.
34332 U.S. 301 (1947).
36Ibid., at 314.
37
The Court also mentions as factors that impel it to defer to Congress: (1) Congress' long
inaction while knowing of such losses; (2) the possibility of surprise; (3) the power of the
United States, itself one of the litigants, to create such liability at its pleasure. 332 U.S. 301,
315-16(1947).
38216 F. 2d 248, 249 (1954).
33 216

39
4

Ibid.

0Ibid.

Ibid. The "intendment" of the Yellow Cab case (apparently considered anew in the light
of the Gilman and Standard Oil decisions) is that "state law will apply on contribution or indemnity unless the internal management of the Government is involved in some special way."
Ibid. The court does not indicate whether or not this "internal-management" criterion is
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The "fiscal problem" in the StandardOil and Gilman cases, however, does not
differ in kind from that in the Arizona case. In each the government has, in fulfillment of an obligation, suffered a loss as the result of a negligent act. In each,
the government seeks to recoup this loss from the negligent party. The court
correctly indicates that the "internal-management" problem of the Gilman case
is not present in the Arizona situation; but the "internal-management" problem
in StandardOil is not so readily distinguishable. Although the government-soldier relationship was involved, the Supreme Court indicated that the outcome
of the suit against Standard Oil would have only a negligible effect on the government's relation to, or obligation toward, the injured soldier. 42 In both
Standard Oil and Arizona the primary question is whether the United States
may recover its loss from a negligent stranger.
Secondly, the Ninth Circuit, in distinguishing the StandardOil case, employs
different criteria for the application of federal law than were used in that case.
The "internal-management" problem is regarded by the Ninth Circuit as being
of controlling importance. But it is not the element of "internal management"
that leads the Court in StandardOil to eschew state law. That factor is considered along with the desirability of uniformity, the absence of peculiarly local
interests, and the federal fiscal problem. The Court accords the greatest emphasis to the last, stating that "the question, therefore, is chiefly one of federal
'43
fiscal policy, not of special or peculiar concern to the states or their citizens.
The Ninth Circuit, however, substitutes a new criterion, referring to "elements
'44
of fiscal policy above and beyond the payment of the original judgment.
There seems to be no basis in the Standard Oil opinion for the introduction of
this "above-and-beyond" requirement.
Thirdly, the Arizona court uses, in distinguishing the Gilman case, tests which
were employed in Gilman not in choosing between federal and state law, but in
deciding whether to defer to Congress or to create a judicial rule. Two levels of
decision are involved: first, whether state law is mandatory; and second,
whether the question is for congressional or judicial determination. 45 In the
Gilman case, too, it is important to distinguish between the Court's failure to
employ state law and its unwillingness to inaugurate employee liability. The
gravity of the consequences of allowing recovery against government employees
convinced the court that the reasons for following StandardOil in deferring to
Congress are "even more compelling. ' 4 The Gilman opinion operates only on
the second level and does not explicitly consider the applicability of federal or
identical with the "element... above and beyond payment" standard that it postulates
earlier.
-2332 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1947).
4
3toid., at 311.
44216 F. 2d 248, 249 (1954).
4
5The two levels of decision are explicitly displayed in the Standard Oil case. 332 U.S. 301,
303-11, 311-17 (1947).
46347 U.S. 507, 511 (1954).
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state law. 47 The Court's justification for not applying state law is left to conjecture. The "internal-management" criterion is employed primarily as a basis
for deferring to Congress; only inferentially is it a factor in rejecting the applicability of state law. The Ninth Circuit, however, decides that absent the "internal-management" problem state law is to be applied. This argument appears
unjustified, for there is no indication that the Court in Gilman considered the
"internal-management" issue controlling in their disregard of state law.4"
Although in fact state law is applied in the Yellow Cab case and ignored in
the Gilman case, neither opinion offers guidance as to the law applicable in the
Arizoza situation.
III
The court in the Arizona case mentions the rule of ErieR. Co. v. Tompkins in
both of its opinions. 49 The court implies that in the absence of some expressly
defined area of federal law, the Erie rule dictates the application of state law.
But the Erie rule has been found by the Supreme Court to be mandatory only
in cases where the jurisdiction of the federal court arises from diversity of citizenship of the parties.5 0 The court's jurisdiction over the Arizona case, however,
4

7 In the court below, 206 F. 2d 846, 848 (C.A. 9th, 1953), the United States had requested
recovery in accordance with state law. After finding that the requisite quasi-contractual basis
for recovery was absent, the court noted that "[tlhe cause of action which the government here
sought to enforce was not one under the [FTCA] which adopts local law for the purpose of defining the Government's tort liability." It declared that the question of the duty of a government employee to the government was properly one for determination by federal rather
than state law. But since the government was found to lack the basis for such a claim under
state or federal law, it was unnecessary to decide this question.
In its petition for certiorari and in its brief before the Supreme Court, the government
conceded that the matter was for determination by federal common law and alleged that
such a right of recovery existed. It asserted that the case was distinguishable from the Standard Oil case in that creation of a new cause of action was not sought and deferral to Congress
was thus unnecessary. Petition for Certiorari at 7,17, United States v. Gilman, ibid.; Brief of
United States at 9, 14, 22, ibid. Cf. Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337, 340 (S.D. Tex.,
1953).
48 The Ninth Circuit implies that the Gilman-Standard Oil criteria for applying federal law
may operate to restrict, but not to permit, recovery by the government. "[lilt is significant that
in [the Gilman and Standard Oil cases] the Supreme Court limits the right of the United States
to recover over when a private citizen, perhaps, would not be so restricted. There is yet no case
where the Supreme Court has created a liability over where none would exist between private
citizens similarly situated." 216 F. 2d 248, 249 (1954).
But once it is recognized that the Gilman opinion does not use the "internal-management" criterion in connection with the problem of applicable state law, this point loses its
force. The Gilman court found "internal management" to be the controlling factor in deferring
to Congress. Since the Arizona case is said to have no comparable "internal-management"
element, the logical conclusion of the Ninth Circuit's argument is not that federal law is inapplicable, but that the Arizona situation does not call for deferral to Congress.
49In its original opinion the court found Erie underlying the Yellow Cab decision. See
note 22 supra. In its second opinion the court refers to an argument for removing the situation
from the scope of the Erie case. 216 F. 2d 248, 249 (1954). But in adhering to its view that the
case is not to be removed from the "intendment" of the Yellow Cab case, it would seem to re-

assert its faith in the applicability of Erie.

50United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947); cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), where the Supreme Court states that "the intent of [Erie] was
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arises from a different source-the power of the federal judiciary to hear all civil
proceedings commenced by the United States."
The Erie rule has been found inapplicable to cases involving matters which
are exclusively federal.' In the Standard Oil case the Court stated:
Whether or not, therefore, state law is to control in such a case as this is not at all a

matter to be decided by application of the Erie rule. For... the question is one of
federal policy, affecting not merely the federal judicial establishment and the groundings of its action, but also the Government's legal interests and relations, a factor
not controlling in the types of cases producing and governed by the Erieruling."3
In terms of its federal character, the Arizona situation has been shown to be
substantially similar to the StandardOil case. 54 The reasoning that led to rejection of the Erie rule there would seem to preclude its application by the Ninth
Circuit.
The government has, both before and after the Erie decision, enjoyed the
right to sue in tort,55 and federal courts have not been bound to apply state law."
to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should
be substantially the same... as it would be if tried in a State court." In Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), the Supreme Court held that the York decision requiring the
application of state law, in accordance with the Erie doctrine, was "inapplicable to enforcement of federal equitable rights" since the case did not come before the Court under diversity
jurisdiction. Cf. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942),
where the scope of the Erie rule was clearly identified with diversity jurisdiction.
562 Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1345 (1950).
52 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944);
United States v. Jones, 176 F. 2d 278 (C.A. 9th, 1949); Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 149
F. 2d 872 (C.A. 3d, 1945). And the law for determination of federally created rights and obligations is federal, not state, law. Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940);
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
53332 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1947). In regard to applicable law, the Standard Oil situation was
held to fall within the rule of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943),
where the Supreme Court found state law and the Erie doctrine inappropriate for the determination of the rights and liabilities that devolve upon the United States consequent to the
exercise of its federal powers. The court there applied federal common law. Cf. United States
v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
54See discussion, pages 725-26 supra.
5E.g., Cotton v. United States, 11 How. (U.S.) 229, 231 (1850); United States v. Silliman,
167 F. 2d 607, 610 (C.A. 3d, 1948), where the court said: "[tihe United States can sue those
who commit tortious acts which result in pecuniary loss to the United States.... [A]uthorities clearly [demonstrate] the standing of the United States as plaintiff to recover pecuniary
loss sustained through a tort recognized at the common law."
6United States v. Silliman, 167 F. 2d 607 (C.A. 3d, 1948); Tennessee v. Hill, 60 Fed. 1005
(C.A. 6th, 1894); cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308-10 (1947). But compare cases where the suit is to assert rights consequent to ownership of land. Cotton v. United
States, 11 How. (U.S.) 229,231 (1850); Denver &R. G. R.R. Co. v. United States, 241 Fed. 614,
618 (C.A. 8th, 1917).
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COMMENTS

The FTCA removed the bar to action in tort against the government and provided for recovery in accordance with local law. But the words of the Act-"the
United States shall be liable... in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual .... " 57 -do not in themselves dictate the application of
local law to a claim by the government. These words apply only to the liability
of the government; it is only when they are construed as embodying the "parity" theory that they prescribe the application of local law to the government's
claim for recovery from its joint tortfeasor. But, in view of the Gilman opinion,
the persuasive force of that theory is not great. It seems, therefore, that the
Act did not modify the pre-existing right of the government to prosecute claims
for losses inflicted by the torts of another.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit could have applied the existing federal law of contribution and indemnity to the Arizona case.5 Or, if the court found it inappropriate to extend the cases in this area to a claim resulting from the waiver of
sovereign immunity,59 it might have found both reason and precedent for denying the claim where Congress had not acted. 0 But neither the FTCA nor the
rule of Erie v. Tompkins dictates that state law be applied to the Arizona case.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1948); see note 2 supra.
IsThe federal law of contribution and indemnity comprises a considerable body of cases.
The leading federal case is Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316
(1896) (where the offense does not involve moral turpitude and is merely valum prohibitunt,
the principal delinquent may be held responsible to his co-delinquent if they are not "equally
criminal"). Recovery was not permitted under this rule where both wrongdoers were "guilty
of a like neglect." Union Stock Yards v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217, 227 (1905).
The rules of these cases have been applied and modified by federal (and other) courts. See, e.g.,
Geo. A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489 (1918); Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v.
Mississippi Export R. Co., 91 F. 2d 125 (C.A. 5th, 1937); Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co., 32 F. 2d 182 (C.A. 2d, 1929); Derry Electric Co. v. New England Tel.
& Tel. Co., 31 F. 2d 51 (C.A. 1st, 1929); Curtis v. Welker, 296 Fed. 1019 (App. D.C., 1924);
Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Washington & Berkeley Bridge Co., 194 Fed. 1011 (N.D. W.Va.,
1912). See George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F. 2d 219 (App. D.C., 1942); Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F. 2d 662 (App. D.C., 1949).
59Had the court found it inappropriate to apply the federal contribution and indemnity
cases to the FTCA area, it might have adopted the local rule as the federal rule. But cf.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1947), as to the relevant considerations.
60
United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301 (1947).
In the first reported opinion to rely on the Gilman case, United States v. Hendler, 123 F.
Supp. 383 (D. Colo., 1954), the court dismissed a claim by the government for reimbursement for premiums paid on a former serviceman's commercial insurance policy pursuant to
the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940. Such proceedings, it was held, are "within
the sweep of [Gilman] which places the selection of policy concerning personal liability in the
discretion of Congress rather than the courts and precludes the latter.., from inaugurating a
policy with respect thereto by implication." Ibid., at 385. Contra: United States v. Nichols,
105 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Iowa, 1952), where recovery was permitted on similar facts, the court
finding no evidence of congressional intent to deprive the government of its common-law
right to reimbursement.
5

